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Recreation Use of Watercourses
LINTRODUCTION
The rights of abutting
landowners and members of the public
to use the surface of watercourses are
governed by several legal doctrines.
Most importantly, their rights are
influenced by surface use and access
rules. The rights of abutting landowners
sometimes are considered part of the
riparian rights doctrine. Protection of
streamflows necessary to private and
public recreational uses are governed by
water allocation doctrines. Water
allocation in the United States is
controlled by different doctrines in the
eastern and western states. In the East,
the riparian doctrine governs; in the
West, it is the prior appropriation
doctrine. Recreational use rights are
influenced also by the public trust
doctrine, doctrine of purprestures,
federal and state navigation powers, and
the Northwest Ordinance.
IL SURFACE USES
A. Surface Uses by Riparians
A riparian landowner has a right
to use the surface of the watercourses
abutting his shoreline.' This is true
whether or not the watercourse is a public
water subject to public use rights. The
states are in conflict, however, whether
the riparian has a right to use the entire
surface of the riparian watercourse' or
only that portion overlying his portion
of its bed.' Of course, where the abutting
watercourse is subject to a public right
of navigation and floatage, as discussed
below, the riparian can go wherever a
member of the public can go.
The riparian may use the
surface in a reasonable manner for
purposes such as, boating, swimming,
bathing, fishing, hunting, and the like.4
Uses which unreasonably impinge on the
rights of other riparians may be limited
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1 Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015 (Wash. 1956). See generally, A. Dan Tarlock, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.17[4] (1988-96);
Robert 1. Reis, Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland Waters, 40 TEMPLE L.Q. 155, 171-79 (1967).
2 Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955); Beach v. Hayner, 173 N.W. 487 (Mich. 1919) [landmark case]; Duval v. Thomas, 114
So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property Owners Ass'n, 511 N.E.2d 226 (111. App. Ct. 1987), afTd 526 N.E.2d 154 (111.
1988); Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W.2d 117 (Mich. 1946); Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960); State Game & Fish Comm'n
v. Louis Fritz Co., 193 So. 9 (Miss. 1940); Waters of White Lake, Inc. v. Fricke, 126 N.E.2d 568 (N.Y. 1955); Taylor Fishing Club v.
Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 78 S.E.2d 588 (Va. 1953); Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d
1015 (Wash. 1956).
Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. 1984); Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.E. 331 (Ind. 1934); Tyler v. Cedar Island
Club, 122 A. 38 (Md. 1923); Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 136 A.2d 645 (N.J. 1957); Shandalee Camp v. Rosenthal, 233 N.Y.S. 11 (Sup.
Ct. 1929); Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686 (Ohio 1890); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1959).
Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015 (Wash. 1956); Bino v. City of Hurley, 76 N.W.2d 571'(Wis. 1956).
Parker v. T & C Dev. Corp., 381 A.2d 679 (Md. 1978) (excessive use of beachfront park); State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.
1963) (boathouse); Bach v. Sarich, 445 P.2d 648 (Wash. 1968) (fill for apartment building in lake bed); Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352
(Wash. 1966) (members of the public as invitees of a riparian).
6 Rutledge v. Young, 646 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Mayer v. Grueber, 138 N.W.2d 197 (Wis. 1965).
Greisinger v. Klinhardt, 9 S.W.2d 978 (Mo. 1928).
See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 780.030 (1995). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1030 (1981).
9 See supra 67 to 70.
"' See, e.g., Baker v. Normanoch Ass'n, 136 A.2d 645 (N.J. 1957). On state navigability definitions,see 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS c. 32
(R. Beck 2d ed. 1991, supp. 1996); supra note 1, A. TARLOCK § 8.05f 2]; Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and
the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 433-34 (1986); Ralph W. Johnson & Russel A. Austin Jr., Recreational Rights
and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. I, 33-52 (1967).
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or enjoined.5
In some states, as discussed
below, the beds of navigable or floatable
waters are owned by the state. In those
states, the riparian has the same rights
to use the surface as members of the
public.
There is no riparian right to use
the surface of an artificial body of water,
except where the riparian owns the bed.'
However, if the artificial body of water
has become a natural watercourse by
passage of time, then the natural
watercourse surface use rules apply.!
B. Surface Uses by Members of The
Public
Definition of public waters.
The public may use the surface of waters
navigable under federal law or
considered public or floatable under state
law.' Federal navigable waters are those
which are or were historically navigated
in waterborne interstate commerce, or
could be made so with reasonable
improvements.' States differ on their
definitions of public waters; they range
from tidal waters alone,"' to waters
Vol. 4*No.2
navigated in intrastate commerce," to all, of the public extend laterally to the public right of navigation if they were
waters capable of floating saw logs and ordinary high water mark.' 6 On tidal rendered floatable by artificial means and
recreational boats.' 2 Navigability is not waters, they extend up to the mean high can be reached from the public water
destroyed by the presence of occasional tide line in most states," but only to the only through a tortuous course with
natural obstructions. mean low tide line in those states which extreme dexterity.-"'
Missouri extends public rights limit public rights to continuously Bed ownership. Those public
to waters capable of floating recreational submerged beds of tidal waters." rightsexist whetherornot the states own
boats." The Missouri courts have In Missouri, members of the the bedsof navigable orfloatable waters.
declared the Mississippi" and Missouri public maygowhereverthepublic waters Where the state owns the beds,2' its
Rivers' to be navigable and subject to extend.' 9 However, there are no cases ownership is for the benefit of the public
public rights. directly defining the lateral extent of and members of the public may use the
Lateral extent ofpublic waters. public waters. Waters connected to surface as beneficiaries of state
On inland waters, the rights of members public waters are not subject to the ownership. States which own the beds
See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979); Baker v. State ex rel. Jones, 87 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1956); Parker v. Durham, 365
S.E.2d 411 (Ga. 1988); DuPont v. Miller, 141 N.E. 423 (111. 1923), appealdismissed 269 U.S. 528 (1925); Patton Park, Inc. v. Pollak, 55
N.E.2d 328 (Ind. 1944); State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990); D'Albora v. Garcia, 144 So.2d 911I (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (dictum), aff gsub nom. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508
(Miss. 1986) (dictum); State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1959). See,
e.g., State v. Mcllroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 843 (1980); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Cal.
App.3d 197w1); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 733 2d 733 (Idaho 1987); Bott v. Commission of Natural
Resources, 327 N.W.2d 838 (Mi. 1982) (saw log test); Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1990) (dictum); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 23-
2-301 (199 1); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d
421 (N.M 1945); Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S. 788 (1994) (recreactional boat test); People v. Kraemer, 7
Misc.2d 373, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Pol. Ct. 1957), aff'd 160 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1959); Gwathmey v. State Through Dep't of Env't, Health
and Natural Resources, 464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995); State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio 1975); Curry
v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158 (Or. 1936); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1422(40) (1984 & Supp. 1992); Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 412 N.W.2d
505 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1987); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (by implication).
" See e.g., City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. App. Ct. 1959); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954).
See e.g., State exerel. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1902); Hickey v. Hazard, 3 Mo. App. 480
(Mo. App. 1877).
'~See e.g., Peterson v. City of St. Joseph, 156 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1941); Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345 (1875).
See e.g., State v. Superior-Court, 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (1981); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake
Watershed Imp. Dist., 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), affd sub om.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildrcth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont.
1984); 101 Ranch v. United States, 714 OnSupp. 1005 (D.N.D. 1988), affd 905 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Ownership of the Bed of
Devils Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1988) (bed title); South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v. South Dakota Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d
26 (S.D. 1985); Wash. Const. art. 17, § I (1988, supp. 1992); Wilbour vGallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878
(1970). See generally, supra note 10 Water and Water Rights § 6.03(a)(2),b3.09[3][d]; Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts
at Settling an Unsettled Boundary, 13 LAND & WATERoL. REV.465(1978).
'7 See e.g., Groves v. Sec'y of Dep't of Natural Resources and Evnt'l Control, 1994 WL 89804 (Del. Sup. 1994); State v. Ashmore, 224
S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 830(1976);, Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom,.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994); City of Newark v.
Natural Resources Counc., 414 A.2d 1304 (NJ. 1980); WASH. CONST. art. 17, § I1(1988, supp. 1992); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wa.
1987). See generally, supra note 10 WATER AND WATER RIGHTSsection 6.03(a)(r1); note I A. TARLOCK section 3.093c ; Maloney &
Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance ofthe Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185 (1974).
oSee e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
"~See e.g., City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
nSee Sneed v. Weber, 307 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
Illinois and Mississippi retain title to beds of tidal waters orother specially designated waters. See ILL.STAT. ANN. C . 19,§ 71 (Smith-
Hurd supp. 1992) (Great Lakes and meandered lakes); International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So.2d 395 (Miss.
1972), cert. denied 414U.S. 827 (1973). Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wyoming use the commercial navigability definition for bed title purposes. See
Hayes v. State, 496 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1973); UnitedStates v. Gossett, 277 F. Supp. II (C.D. Cal. 1967); FLA. CoNsT., art. 10, § 11(1968,
1970); West v. Smith, 511 P2d 1326 (Idaho 1973); LA. Civ. CODEANN., art. 450 (1980); State ex rel. Head v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530
(Minn. 1971); MONT. REV. CODEANN.§ 70-1-202(1991); State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972); Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma,
402 F.2d 739 (1 th Cir. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT.§§274.025,780.010(1995); Hurley v. American Enka Corp., 93 F.Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn.
1950); Utah State Road Cormm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 486P.2d 391 (Utah 197 1); WASH. CONsT., art. 17,)§ B(1987); Day v.Armstong, 362
P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Kansas uses a somewhat more expansive test. See Grape v. Laiblin, 314 P.2d 335 (Kan. 1957). See North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin use the recreational boat definition for bed title purposes. Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955);
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of navigable or floatable waters use the navigability test for state bed easement of navigation is recognized
three different definitions of navigability ownership." The state owns beds over such privately owned beds above
mentioned above for bed title underlying commercially navigable that mark." The Missouri courts have
purposes. 2 Where the state does not waters." Commercially navigably waters declared the beds of the Mississippi"
own the beds of navigable of floatable do not include waters floatable only by and Missouri Rivers32 to be owned by
streams, the abutting riparians own bed small recreational boats." Private the state. Useof islands in public waters
title." However, those private bed titles ownership extends to the ordinary low depends on the location of title. Title to
are impressed with a public easement of water mark." The ordinary low water islands depends initially on the navigable
navigation or floatage. 4  mark is a statistical average of the margin status of the watercourse and
Missouri uses the commercial of the water at low flows' A public subsequently on legislative disposition
State v. McFarren, 215 N.W.2d 459 (Wis. 1974) (lakes only). See Davis, State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waer-A Summary and
Reexamination, 57 NEB. L REV. 665,c675-76 n. 51(1978).
On coastal waters, a majority of states own the bed to the mean high tide line.
See Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, reh'g denied 296 U.S. 664 (1935); United States v. Property on Pinto
Island, 74 F.Supp. 92 (S.D. Ala. 1947); ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.820 (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 670, 830 (1982); Trustees of Internal
Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So.2d 10 (Fra. 1969); Van Ruynibeke v. Patapsco Indus. Park, 276 A.2d 61 (Md. 1971); Cinque
Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), a d sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988);
O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 235 A.2d I (N.J. 1967); Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, 102 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1913); Carolina Beach Fishing
Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 177 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. 1970); Winston Bros. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 62 P2d 7(Or. 1936):
Attomey-General ex rel. Jackvony v. Powell, 21 A.2d 554 (1941); Cape Romain L-and & Imp. Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co.,
146 S.E. 434 (1928); WASH. Co NsT., art. 17, § I (1987); Hughes v. State, 4 10 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1966).
On a minority of coastal states, the state owns the bed to the mean low tide line. See State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 228 A.2d 587 (Del. 1967); Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986),e557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Imp. Ass'n, Inc.. 173 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 196 1); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524 (1845); Wall v. Pittsburgh Harbor Co., 41 A.2d
875 (1945); Whealton & Wisher v. Doughty, 116 Va. 566, 82 S.E.2d 94 (1914).
On inland navigable waters in some states, the boundary of state-owned beds is the ordinary high water mark. See Howard
v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. 381 (185 1); City of Cedar Rapids v. Marshall, 203 N.W. 932 (Iowa 1925); Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mi.
1930); Carpenter v. Board of Comm'rs, 58 N.W. 295 (1894); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-104(1991); South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v.
Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1986); WASH. CONsT., art. 17, § 1(1987); State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis.
1987). In other states, the boundary is the ordinary low water mark. CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (1982); County of Lake v. Smith, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 809 (Cal. App. 2d 199 1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978); Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955); Mathews v.
Bagnik, 157 Pa. Super. 115, 41 A.2d 875 (Pa. Sup. 1945); S.D. Comp. LAWsANN. § 43-17-1 (1983); Carpenter v. Ohio River Sand &
Gravel Corp., 134 W.Va. 587,60 S.E.2d 212 (1950).
On the boundary between the state-owned beds of navigable waters and the privately-owned shore, see generally supra note
10 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS section 6.03(a); note I A. TARLOCK section 3.0913][c-d].
22 See supra note 21 Davis, at 674-76 nn. 50-5s, 680-81 nn. 68-71, 699-700 n. 152.
1 Colorado, Illinois, and Nebraska employ the tidal test for bed title purposes. See Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 665 (Col. 1905); Leitch
v. Sanitary Dist., 17 N.E.2d 34 (W4. 1938) (except Great Lakes and meandered lakes); Valder v. Wallis, 242 N.W.2d 112 (Neb. 1976).
Wisconsin gives title of navigable streams capable of floating recreational boats, but not such lakes, to abutting riparians. See Munninghoff
v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1949). Although they have not defined navigability for bed title purposes,
Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio give title to beds of navigable waters to abutting riparians. See Commonwealth v. Henderson County, 371
S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1963); Hall v. Wantz, 57 N.W.2d 462 (Mich. 1953) (except Great Lakes); State ex ret. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co.,
336 N.E.2d 453 (Ohio 1975) (except Great Lakes).
24 See, e.g., Groves v. Sec'y of Dep't of Natural Resources and Envt'l Control, 1994 WL 89804 (Del. Super. 1994); Elder v. Delcour, 269
S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954); Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788(1994); New York State Water Resources Comm'n
v. Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1971), appeal dismissed, 280 N.E.2d 889; Kraft v. Burr. 476 S.E.2d 715 (Va. 1996).
25 See e.g., Skinner v. Osage County, 822 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 199 1); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954); Hauber v.
Gentry, 215 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. 1948).
6See Skinner v. Osage County, 822 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Sibley v. Eagle Marine Indus., Inc., 607 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1980);
Volkerding v. Brooks, 359 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1962); Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960); Hauber v. Gentry, 215 S.W.2d 754 (Mo.
1948).
27 See Skinner v. Osage County, 822 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. C. App. 199 1).
SSeeSkinner v. Osage County, 822 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); E.D. Mitchell Living Trust v. Murray, 818 .W.2d 326 (Mo. App.
Ct. 1991); Sibley v. Eagle Marine Indus., Inc., 607 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1980); Volkerding v. Brooks, 359 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1962); Conran
v.Girvin, 341 SW.2d75 (Mo. 1960); Hatvedt v. Harpst, 173 S.W.2d65 (Mo. 1943); State exrel. Citizens' Elec.Lighting &Power Co.,
69 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1902).
See Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960).
BiSee Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954): Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grabner, 219 S.W. 975 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920) logs].
See e.g. State ex ret. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co., 69 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1902).





Owners of the shore or bed may not
exclude or block public use of the waters
over the bed.34 Because public rights
extend only wherever the water extends,
the public cannot traverse temporarily
exposed beds of rivers, lakes and coastal
waters." The coastal states are divided
whether the public may traverse the dry
sand portion,"6 the wet sand portion of a
coastal beach," or only the portion
covered by water.3 While the public may
incidentally touch the bed or banks while
engaged in navigation," it may not
occupy the bed" or use the shoreline
along or islands in inland waters for
water-related activities.4 ' The public may
not portage from one watercourse to
another.42
In Missouri, owners of the
shore or bed may not exclude or block
use of the surface or privately-owned
beds of public waters by the public. 3
Since public rights extend wherever the
public waters extend, members of the
public may traverse over the submerged
beds of public water, even the privately-
owned portions which lie beneath
commercially nonnavigable waters and
portions which lie between the ordinary
low water mark and the shore of
navigable waters." The public may
incidentally touch the bed or use the
bank,4 5 but may not use the shore or
private-owned islands for extended
water-related activities."
Types ofpublic uses. Members
of the public may use public waters for
swimming, boating, bathing, fishing,
hunting, and the like.4 1 Such uses
include a right to wade in the water over
a privately-owned bed.48 Uses which
unreasonably impinge on the rights of
other members of the public or of private
riparians may be limited or enjoined.49
The government may regulate public use
of the surface, such as by imposing boat
speed limits." Where excess use is a
problem, the government may limit the
number of public users."
In Missouri, members of the
public may use public waters for
swimming, boating, fishing, wading, and
the like."
Public rights in side canals.
The law is mixed whether the public right
* Islands in nonnavigable waters belong to the riparian owner of the bed. Islands in navigable waters initially belong to the State. See
Skinner v. Osage County, 822 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. App. Ct. 1991); Peterson v. City of St. Joseph, 156 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1941). However,
by legislation in 1895, islands in navigable rivers and riverbeds no longer contained flowing water ("abandoned riverbeds") are transferred
to the respective counties for school purposes. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 241.290, .300; Volkerding v. Brooks, 359 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1962);
Conran v. Girvin, 341 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1960); Ancona Realty Co. v. Frazier, 41 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1931). The counties may sell those
islands and abandoned riverbeds. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 241.309-.3 10. But islands formed in the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers may
be retained by the Conservation Commission or the State Park Board (DNR) for wildlife habitat or recreational purposes; the counties
receive title only to islands surplus to those needs. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 241.291.
-' See Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974).
3 See Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878 (1970); Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923).
Cf. South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v. Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1986) (boundary of state-owned bed moves with
fluctuating water level).
I See, e.g., Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968); Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1983); State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
" See e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); City of Daytona Beach Shores v. State, 483 So.2d 405 (Fla.
1986).
" See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
1979).
9 See e.g., Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984) (portaging around obstructions);
Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1994) (guiding boats through shallow places; portaging around rapids);
Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1949) (anchoring boat, poling boat); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137 (Wyo. 1961) (portaging around shoals and rapids).
See, e.g., Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1949) (muskrat traps); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137 (Wyo. 1961) (wading).
" See, e.g., Gait v. State, Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
42 See e.g., Lundberg v. University of Notre Dame, 282 N.W. 70 (Wis. 1938).
43 See e.g., City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954).
* Id.
" See e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954) (portaging around obstructions); O'Fallon v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343 (Mo.
1836)(dictum).
* See e.g., Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954)(dictum) (fishing from bank); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grabner, 219 S.W. 975 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1920) (landing floating logs); O'Fallon v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343 (Mo. 1836) (repairing steamboat).
* See e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914). See generally, supra note 10 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS c. 31; note
I A. TARLOCK section 8.06[2]. See also Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1030 (1981).
See Rushton ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, II N.W.2d 193 (Mich. 1943).
Cf. Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966) (invitees of publicly-owned boat rental facility on non-public lake).
a See Menzer v. Elkhart Lake, 186 N.W.2d 290 (Wis. 1971).
5' Cf. Botton v. State, 420 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1966) (invitees of publicly-owned boat rental facility on non-public lake). See People ex rel.
Younger v. El Dorado County, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (ban on rafting & boating held unreasonable).
5 See Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954).
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to use the surface extends into dredged
side canals filled with water from public
waters." Some courts reason that public
access is allowed and public rights
extend into side canals because they are
continuously floatable from the public
water and the water in them comes from
the public water." On the other hand,
other courts reason that the side canal
was artificially created and is not part of
the naturally-created public
watercourse? But in one case involving
a flood-enlarged previously-nonfloatable
connection of a nonpublic "fishing hole"
to a public water, nonpublic status was
retained." There are no Missouri cases
on point.
Two of the decisions favoring
public waters status for constructed side
canals are from common law
jurisdictions." However, the third such
decision involves connection of a
privately-owned water to a public water?'
One decision favoring private waters
status is from a civil law jurisdiction,
which limits public rights to natural
watercourses.5 ' The other decision
favoring private status involved
connection to a previously nonpublic
water and did not involve constructed
side canals." Thus, common law
jurisdictions, like Missouri, may favor
public waters status for constructed side
canals, but are divided whether to retain
private water status for previously
nonpublic waters later connected to
public waters.
State regulation of
obstructions to navigation. Many states
regulate bulkhead and pierhead lines,"
and piers and wharves and other
obstructions to navigation.62 In states
which recognize a state navigation
servitude, states and local governments
need not pay compensation for
impairment or destruction of access to
or navigability of state navigable
waters.13  Several states regulate
wetlands dredging and filling.'
Missouri has not enacted any
statutes regulating structures in
navigable waters, obstructions to
navigation, or wetlands filling and
dredging. By default, regulation of all
See supra note 10, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS section 32.02(a) n. 14.
* See People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1957),aff'd 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. 1957); Hughes v. Nelson, 303 S.C. 102,
399 S.E.2d 24 (S.C. 1990) (obstruction of 1700 foot long canal used by recreational boats for 15 years); Klingeisen v. State Dep't of
Natural Resources, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (assertion of state jurisdiction over artificial side canal to boathouses).
* See e.g., Amigo Enterprises v. Gonzales, 581 So.2d 1082 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (dead-end canal navigable in fact, but previously used by
public).
* See Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1990).
See Hughes v. Nelson, 399 S.E.2d 24 (S.C. 1990); Klingeisen v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
See People v. Kraemer, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 1957), aff'd 160 N.E.2d 633 (1957).
See Amigo Enterprises, Inc. v. Gonzales, 581 So.2d 1082 (La. Ct. App. 1991), citing LA. CIVIL CODE art. 450.
" See Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1990).
* See e.g., Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200 (Fla. 1882). Statutes which authorize the establishment of harbor and bulkhead lines,see, e.g.,
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 71 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 91, § 34 (West 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.959 (West
1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.126 (West 1989). See generally supra note I A. TARLOCK § 3.17[ I ][a.
6 See e.g., CAL. Pus. RES. CODE §§ 323.5b (West 1975) [6321 (supp. 1992)]; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., cl. 91, §§ 12, 14, 19, 23 (West 1969,
supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.953 (West 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-101 (1991); N.Y. NAV. LAW §§ 31-32 (McKinney
Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN STAT. sec 146-3 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§79.90.105, 79.95.010 (West 1991) [88.24.10 (1962)]; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 30.12 (West 1989).
For cases interpreting such permit statutes, see, e.g., Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 254 A.2d 884 (Conn. 1969);
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 466 So.2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Swain v. Chicago, B. &
Q. R.R., 160 Ill. App. Ct. 533 (1911); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Maryland Marine Mfg. Co., 560 A.2d 32 (Md. 1989); Thom v.
Rasmussen, 358 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1954); State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1963); Pfau v. Adirondack Park
Agency, 524 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Walker v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, Health and Natural Resources, 433 S.E.2d 767
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1008 (U.S. 1988). State v. Bleck, 338
N.W.2d 492 (Wis. 1983). Cf Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969).
See generally supra note 10, I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS section 6.01(a)(2); note I A. TARLOCK section 3.17[1]. See also
Plager, Interference with the Public Right ofNavigation and the Riparian Owners' Claim ofPrivilege, 33 Mo. L. REV. 608 (1968).
1 See e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1967); Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 254 A.2d 884 (Conn. 1969); Peck v. Alfred
Olsen Constr. Co., 245 N.W. 131 (Iowa 1932); Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124 (Mass. 1909); New York State
Water Resources Bd. v. Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971), appeal dismissed, 280 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 1972); State v.
Cleveland & P. R.R., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916); State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492 (Wis. 1983). Cf. Captain Soma Boat Line v. City of
Wisconsin Dells, 255 N.W.2d 441 (Wis. 1977). See generally supra note 1, 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS section 6.01(a)(1); note 1, A
TARLOCK, section 3.17[3].
* Inland wetlands dredging and filling and shoreland development generally are regulated in Michigan, Minnesota, Vermont, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See e.g.. MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 281-631 to -644; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105-485; VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, §§ 1421-1426;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.971, 144.26. Coastal wetlands are regulated in Califomia. Connecticut, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, and
Washington. See e.g., CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 66601-66661; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-28 to - 15; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2401 to -2413;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 471-476, 478; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. I 31, § 40A; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-I to -69; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 433-A: Ito 6; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9-A- I to -10; N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0602; N.C. GEN. STAT. § I13-229; R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 2-1-13 to -25, 11-46.1-1, 49-27-1 to -69; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to .20; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58. On state
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wetlands and regulation of obstructions
on federally navigable waters, such as
the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, is
left entirely to the federal government.
Municipal jurisdiction over
structures in riverbed. Under their
zoning authority, municipalities may
regulate the location or construction of
docks and other structures along or
within watercourses." In Missouri,
zoning authority has been expressly
extended to structures within 100 yards
of the shoreline of lakes with a total
shoreline of at least 150 miles.' This
provision probably was intended to
apply to the Lake of the Ozarks and other
large reservoirs. It is not clear whether
this statute impliedly denies exercise of
such zoning authority over structures in
rivers or smaller lakes.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF
OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION
Federal jurisdictional waters.
The federal government has
constitutional power to regulate
navigation on navigable waters of the
United States. Waters subject to federal
navigation jurisdiction include waters in
three categories:" (1) waters which are
being used presently for commercial
navigation in waterborne interstate
commerce," (2) waters so used
historically (such as by fur traders in
canoes, by keelboats, or by sawlogs
floated to market)," and (3) waters which
are "susceptible of navigation" and can
be made navigable by feasible
improvements at reasonable cost. 0 This
includes canals constructed across
fastland." The mere ability of the
watercourse to float recreational boats
does not establish navigability for federal
regulatory purposes."
Lateral extent ofjurisdictional
waters. Federal navigation jurisdiction
extends laterally to the ordinary high
water mark.7 1 The ordinary high water
mark is the highest level the navigable
watercourse reaches without
overflowing its banks and flooding
adjacent land."
Extension of federal
jurisdiction to side canals. In United
States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.," the
court held that side canals connected to
navigable waters required a § 10 permit
if their construction affected the bed,
location, or currents of the navigable
water.7 The court characterized the
connected canals as analogous to
tributaries to navigable waters, which are
subject to federal jurisdiction because
they affect the navigable capacity of
navigable waters. But landlocked canals
above the mean high tide line, although
influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tide, were held not subject to the
navigation power.7 In a companion case,
Weistmann v. District Engineer, U.S.
Army Corps ofEngineers," the court held
that canals connected indirectly to
navigable waters via pre-existing mesne
canals are subject to federal navigable
waters jurisdiction.
Navigation power. The federal
government (through the Corps of
Engineers) has the constitutional power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate
navigation on interstate and federal
navigable waters. It may do any act,
impose any condition, or require removal
of any structure for purposes of
maintaining or improving navigation.'
wetlands dredging and filling regulation, see generally supra note 10, 5 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 61.02; note 1, A. TARLOCK,
section 3.17[2][b].
* See e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (1996); McDonald v. City of Lake Lotawana, 721 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.020.4 (1996).
" See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4; On the definition of federal jurisdictional waters under the navigation power generally, see supra note 10, WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.02(b); note, 1, A. TARLOCK, section 9.03[1].
* See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
See Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921). However, federal admiralty jurisdiction extends only to waters
presently being used for navigation in interstate commerce. See Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Mons, 921 F.2d 775
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S. 898 (1991) (Lake of the Ozarks).
I See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Washington Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.
1985); The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874). The reasonableness of potential navigability under Appalachian is explored in Washington
Water Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1985).
' See Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
72 See United States v. Ross, 74 F.Supp. 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
' See33C.F.R. § 329.11(a)(1); United States v. Virginia Elec. &Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961 ); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins.
Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). The level of annual floods is outside the
ordinary high water mark. See Willis v. United States, 50 F.Supp. 99 (S.D.W.Va. 1943),aff'd, 141 F.2d 214(4th Cir. 1944). See generally
supra note 67, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 35.02(b), at 133.
1 On the location of the ordinary high water mark, see United States v. Southern Inv. Co., 876 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Schmitt, 734 F.Supp. 1035 (E.D.N.Y. 199); United States v. Cameron, 466 F.Supp. 1099 (M.D.Fla. 1978); Borough of Ford City v.
United States, 345 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 428 (1851). See also
Maloney, The Ordinary High Water Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled Boundary, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 465 (1978).
7 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
7 See also United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940 (1981). For discussion of § 10 permits, see supra
notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
I See United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1299 (5th Cir. 1976).
7 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976).
* See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544(1981); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). On the federal navigation power generally, see
supra note 67, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 35.02(b); note 67, A. TARLOCK, section 9.0311). On its historic origins, see Shalat, Water
and Bureaucracy: Origins of the Federal Responsibility for Water Resources, 1787-1838, 32 NAT. RES. J. 5 (1992); MacGrady, The
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Effect of Kaiser Aetna. In
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,' the Court
held that the authority of the federal
government under the navigation power
and the public right of access on the
surface may not be coextensive. It held
that exercise of the navigation power
extends to waters navigable in fact in
interstate commerce and a permit can be
required to connect nonpublic waters to
navigable waters." But it held also that
the navigation servitude cannot be
applied to previously rionnavigable
waters and that the federal government
can compel public access onto naturally
nonpublic waters only upon payment of
compensation.2 The significance of
Kaiser Aetna is its interpretation of the
scope of the navigation servitude;
previously it had been assumed that it
extended wherever the navigation power
extended." The federal courts have
disengaged the lateral extent of the
navigation power and the navigation
servitude since Kaiser Aetna. 4
Corps of Engineers § 10
permits. The navigation power includes
the power to regulate the permanent
anchoring of vessels to the beds of
navigable waters." The navigation
power also includes the power to
regulate access to and structures within
the watercourses.' First, the Corps of
Engineers has established bulkhead and
pierhead lines under Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, § 11 .8 Behind those lines
structures erected in the streambed
generally are considered not to be
obstructions to navigation.' Second, it
requires riparians to obtain permits for
fills and structures within streambeds
beyond the ordinary high water mark
under Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
§ 10.1 Unlicensed fills and structures
are unlawful obstructions to navigation
which the Corps can order to be removed
under Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
§ 12.x
Wetlands fill & dredging
permits. Under Clean Water Act § 404,
the Corps of Engineers can regulate the
filling and dredging of wetlands.9 1
Routes of possible access through
swamps and marshes will be subject to
permitting under this act. Missouri has
not assumed any wetlands regulatory
responsibility, although some other
states have.
Federal preemption. Exercise
of federal authority under the navigation
power preempts any conflicting state law,
policy, or permits?2
Ordinarily, the Corps of
Engineers will not grant a § 10 permit
unless and until it receives confirmation
of favorable state and local governmental
determinations under their regulatory
statutes.93
Permit denial. The Corps of
Engineers can deny a § 10 permit either




obstructions to federally navigable
waters under the navigation power and
the navigation servitude. Under the
navigation servitude, the federal
government need not pay any
compensation for adverse effects on
private rights resulting from the exercise
Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold
Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511 (1975).
* 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Under Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, § 10; 33 U.S.C. § 403.
92 Since the navigation servitude does not extend to naturally nonpublic waters. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80
(1979).
83 The Court of Appeals had held that the navigation power and the navigation servitude were coextensive. See Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 584 E2d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd 444 U.S 164 (1978).
* See, e.g., Boone v. United States, 944 F2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1991); Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982).
* See United States v. Oak Beach Inn Corp., 744 F.Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See The Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59
U.S. 421 (1855).
87 See 33 U.S.C. § 404; Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. 23 (1861).
See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(o)(2).
99See 33 U.S.C. § 403; 33 C.F.R. §§ 321-23. On the Corp's § 10 permit program see generally, supra note 67, 4WATER AND WATER RIGHTS,
section 35.02(b). See also Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program ofthe U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, 63 VA. L.
REV. 503 (1977); I MISSOURI ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 8.5 (Mo. Bar CLE 1991-96).
For cases interpreting § 10, see Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); United States v. Boyden, 696 F.2d 685
(9th Cir. 1983); Norfolk & Western Co. v. United States, 641 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,
526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
33 U.S.C. § 406.
m 33 U.S.C. § 1344. On the Clean Waters Act § 404 wetlands dredge and fill permit program, see generally, W. Want, Law of Wetlands
Regulation (1989-96); 1 MISSOURI ENVIRONMENTAL LAw §§ 8.25-8.28 (Mo. Bar 1991-96).
92 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. F.P.C., 328 U.S. 879 (1946). On federal preemption,
see generally supra, note 67, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 35.08; note 67, A. TARLOCK, Section 9.05.
- 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(j)(4).
91 See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S 569 (1992); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (197 1) (denial
of § 10 permit for recreational subdivision in order to preserve mangrove swamp). Cf. Namekagon Hydro Co. v. F.P.C., 216 F.2d 509 (7th
Cir. 1954) (denial of dam license in order to preserve free-flowing canoeing stream).
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of its navigation authority. Private titles
to the beds of and state-created water
use rights in federally navigable waters
are impressed with a servitude in favor
of the public right of navigation. 3 This
federal servitude is paramount to private
titles and water rights because the public
right of navigation existed prior to the
creation of those private titles and rights
and because the federal government has
no authority to convey private titles free
of the servitude.' Under the navigation
power, the federal government may do
any act, impose any condition, or require
removal of any structure for purposes of
maintaining or improving navigation;
under the navigation servitude it need
not pay any compensation for any injury
or impairment to private titles or water
use rights related to the navigable
watercourse.9 7 It authorizes without
compensation the destruction of
access," changes in the level and course
of a navigable stream," changes in bridge
elevation,"' appropriation of or removal
of structures on the streambed,"" and
destruction of state-created water rights
incident to navigable waters." 2 Exercises
of the navigation servitude are not
considered to be takings, since the
affected private interests have from the
beginning of their creation been subject
to the paramount and preexisting public
rights of navigation and fishery.""
The federal navigation
servitude does not extend to
nonnavigable tributaries,"" nor to
previously nonnavigable waters recently
made navigable and connected to
navigable waters."' Destruction of
access to or navigability of nonnavigable
waters by the federal government may
require payment of compensation."
Takings cases. It is too soon
to know whether the Supreme Court's
recent reevaluation of regulatory takings
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council"' and Dolan v. City of Tigard"'
will affect the scope of federal
government's regulatory jurisdiction.
Lucas bars regulations which eliminate
all practical economic uses of land,
unless compensation is paid. Dolan
requires that permit conditions have a
rough proportionality to the impacts of
the regulated activity; conditions
designed to mitigate unregulated side
effects, including environmental effects
are not allowed. Particularly vulnerable
may be permit denials, including those
for environmental reasons, under
wetlands, wildlife habitat, beachfront
protection, and shoreland zoning
statutes and regulations. A regulatory
taking was found in Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States" when the Corps
of Engineers denied a mangrove swamp
fill permit under Clean Water Act § 404.
Lucas and Dolan may also affect the
scope of immunity under the navigation
servitude.
IV. ACCESSRIGHTS
Access by riparians. In both
" See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121(1967); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799(1950); Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U.S. 141 (1900).
Congress codified the navigation power and navigation servitude in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, §§ 3(d), 6, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(d), 1314 (1986, supp. 1991); and in the U.S. Territories Submerged Lands Act of 1974, §§ 2(b), (c), 48 U.S.C. §§ 1706(b), (c)
(1988).
On the navigation servitude, see generally supra note 67, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, note 67, section 35.02(c); note 67, A.
TARLOCK, section 9.04. See also Munro, The Navigation Servitude and the Severance Doctrine, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 491 (1971);
Bartke, Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV. I (1968); Morreale, Federal Power in
Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule ofNo Compensation, 3 NAT. REs. J. I (1963).
1 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
* See F.P.C. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
* See United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); Gibson v. United States, 166
U.S. 269 (1897).
9 See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Chicago, M. St.P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941);
South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
See Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364(1907).
101 See United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.
53(1913).
102 Id.
"0 See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
"" See e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
ms See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
"' See e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (injury to fastlands on nonnavigable tributary). But the United States may affect
the flow in nonnavigable tributaries without compensation for the purpose of protecting the navigable capacity of the navigable mainstream.
See United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229(1960). On the impact of the federal navigation servitude on landowners'
riparian rights on nonnavigable tributaries, see supra note 67, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 35.02(c)(1); note 67, A. TARLOCK,
section 9.04121[b]; note 95, Morreale, at 60-63.
sm 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
us 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
"" 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107 S.Ct.926 (1987), on remand 21 CI.Ct. 161 (1991) (the navigation servitude was not
involved), rev'd 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.denied I15 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
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riparian and prior appropriation states, a
riparian landowner has a right of access
to the watercourse from his frontage.'o
The riparian's right includes the right to
wharfout, an obvious method of gaining
access to the water."' The right to wharf
out includes a right to place water-
related structures, such as rafts, over the
bed of the watercourse, even if they do
not touch the riparian's shore,"' and to
place mooring buoys in the stream."
Although a riparian may grant an
easement of access to another, a mere
easement is presumed not to include a
right to wharf out."4 The right of access
also includes the right to fill the bed under
some circumstances.' 15
Missouri recognizes the
riparian rights of access, wharfing out,
and mooring."
The rights of access, wharfing
out, and filling are subject to the limitation
that their exercise may not unreasonably
interfere with the correlative rights of
other riparians to use the surface"' and
the public rights of navigation and
floatage."" Such interferences can be
abated as public nuisances."'9
Such public rights do not
include the mooring of vessels and
fishing rafts by persons other than the
riparian shoreowner; they are
trespasses. 1 ' The state, too, as
proprietor of the beds of navigable
waters, has the same right as private
owners of streambeds to exclude
trespasses by other riparians and by the
public. Hence, the riparian frontage
owner cannot construct a pier from his
frontage over the state-owned bed; 2'
state bed title is dominant to the riparians'
right to wharf out. Therefore, consent of
the state is required for private piers
extending beyond the boundary onto
state-owned beds.122
In Missouri, the riparians'
rights of access and wharfing out cannot
unreasonably interfere with the
correlative rights of other riparians to use
the surface for navigation or the public
right of navigation.' Riparians located
""See Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); CAL. CONST. Art. 10, § 4(1976); State v. Knowles-Lombard Co., 122 Conn.
263, 188 A. 275 (1936); Linn Farms, Inc. v. Edlen, Ill 111. App. 2d 294, 250 N.E.2d 681 (1969); People's Counsel v. Maryland Marine
Mfg. Co., 316 Md. 491, 560 A.2d 32 (1989); Park Elm Homeowner's Ass'n v. Mooney, 398 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1987); Tiffany v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 234 N.Y. 15, 136 N.E. 224 (1922); Horry City v. Tilghman, 283 S.C. 475, 322 S.E.2d 831 (1984); Thurston v. City of
Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678 (1965); Strom v. Sheldon, 12 Wash. App. 66, 527 P.2d 1382 (1974), review denied85 Wash. 2d
1001 (1975). See generally supra note 67, 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTs, section 6.01 (a)(1).
"I See Bloom v. Water Resources Comm'n, 254 A.2d 884 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1969); Board of Trustees of Internal Imp. Trust Fund v.
Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.2d 209 (Fla. App. 1973); Sundell v. Town of New London, 409 A.2d 1315 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1979);
Town of Islip v. Powell, 358 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §780.040 (1995) [commercial wharves]; VA. CODE § 62.1-
164 (1992); Langley v. Meredith, 376 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 1989). See generally supra note 67, 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTs, section 6.01 (a)(2);
note 67, A. TARLOCK, section 3.17[1 ]; Plager, Interference with the Public Right ofNavigation and theRiparian Owners' Claim ofPrivilege,
33 Mo. L. REV. 608 (1968).
(2 See Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 407 A.2d 738 (Md. App. 1979).
" See Beelman River Terminals, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank, N.A., 880 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. App. Ct. 1994).
See Klotz v. Horn, 537 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. App. 1989); Thies v. Howland, 380 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. App. 1985); Lien v. Loraus, 403
N.W.2d 286 (Minn. App. 1987).
"S See generally supra note 67, A. TARLOCK, section 3.17[2].
"^ See e.g., Beelman River Terminals, Inc. v. Mercantile Bank, N.A., 880 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. App. Ct. 1994); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Stone,
117 S.W. 604 (Mo. 1909); St. Louis, K. & N.W. R.R. v. St. Louis Union Stock Yards Co., 25 S.W. 399 (Mo. 1894); Meyers v. City of St.
Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266 (Mo. 1880).
"7 See Burt v. Munger, 23 N.W.2d 117 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1946); Back v. Sarich, 445 P.2d 648 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1968).
"" See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894); State v. Knowles-Lombard Co., 188 A. 275 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1936); Boston Waterfront
Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1979); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1994);
Haher's Sodus Point Bait Shop, Inc. v. Wigle, 139 A.D.2d 950, appeal denied 532 N.E.2d 101 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988); Capune v. Robbins,
160 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1968); Nosek v. Stryker, 309 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. App. 1981). See generally supra note 67, 1 WATER AND
WATER RIGHTs, section 6.01 (a)(2).
"' See Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 68 A. 527 (Me. 1907); State ex rel. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S.W.
374 (Mo. 1902); Reyburn v. Sawyer, 47 S.E. 761 (N.C. 1904); Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 49 N.W. 978 (Wic. 1879). See also supra
note 189 (cases on enjoinable purprestures).
20o See Kliebert Educ. Trust v. Watson Marines Serv., Inc., 454 So.2d 855 (La. App. 1984); Hall v. Wantz, 57 N.W.2d 462 (1953).
"I See Johnson v. Tlush, 468 So.2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1985); Bath v. Courts, 459 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Pierson v.
Coffey, 706 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985), rev. denied 706 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 825 (1986); Peters v. Polvi,
175 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Morgan v. Town of North Hempstead, 424 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), appeal
dismissed 424 N.E.2d 560 (N.Y. 198 1); Zagaroli v. Pollock, 379 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989),rev. denied 384 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1989).
122 See Woods v. Johnson, 50 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Hotchkiss Grove Ass'n v. Water Resources Comm'n, 282 A.2d 890
(Conn. 1971); Tilton v. City of Haverhill, 42 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1942); Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984),
cert. denied 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802 (R.I. 1960). However, the common law of some states
recognizing the low water mark as the boundary of the state-owned bed allows riparians to construct piers over that bed. See, e.g., Bloom
v. Water Resources Comm'n, 254 A.2d 884 (Conn. 1969); Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So.2d Ill (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), rev denied 601
So.2d 552 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S.916 (1992); State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 1971). See generally supra note 67,
1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 6.01 (a)(2), at 106-07.
2 See State ex rel. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1902); St. Louis, K. & N.W. R.R. v. St. Louis
Union Stock Yards Co., 25 S.W. 399 (Mo. 1894).
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on navigable waters cannot construct
piers beyond the ordinary low water
mark, 2 4 unless the consent of the state
is obtained. Since Missouri has no
statute on licensing wharves, both
executive or legislative consent of the
state must be obtained under its general
power to grant easements.' 2s
The federal government (the
Corps of Engineers) on federal navigable
waters and the states on state navigable
and floatable waters have regulated
access and structures within
watercourses in two ways. First, they
have established bulkhead and pierhead
lines behind which it is lawful to fill the
streambed and to erect structures.2 6
Second, they have required riparians to
obtain permits for fills and structures
within streambeds; unlicensed fills and
structures are unlawful obstructions to
navigation which can be required to be
removed.'12 7
Access by members of the
public. Members of the public do not
have the right to cross private land to
gain access to public waters.'"9 To do so
constitutes a trespass.
Governmental entities may
acquire access to public waters by
purchase or condemnation.' " They must
pay compensation for "takings"; they
may not require transfer of access rights
as a condition for a regulatory
approval.' Acquisition of a public right
of access includes the right to construct
a public pier.'
V. STATE LAWS
Water allocation doctrines also
influence the extent of private and public
uses of water surfaces. In particular, they
influence the ability of abutting
landowners and the public to protect
minimum streamflows needed to maintain
river and lake levels.
A. Riparian Rights Law of Etistern
States
In the 31 eastern states,3 2 water
use is governed by the riparian rights
doctrine, which allows each water user,
old and new, a reasonable share of the
water. It was described first in 1827 in
the American case, Tyler v. Wilkinson. 3
Under the doctrine each owner of land
abutting on a stream is entitled both to
receive the natural flow of water and to
make reasonable uses of that water. This
obvious contradiction has led the courts
to emphasize one element or the other.
Most American courts emphasize the
right to make a reasonable use.
Permissible uses include domestic and
livestock water supply, irrigation,
manufacturing, and hydropower.'34 No
riparian can take all the water, but must
share it with other riparians; each is
entitled only to a reasonable share. A
reasonable share is that which is fair in
light of the water uses made by other
riparians, their effects on each other, the
locations of various uses and diversions,
and streamflow characteristics. The
riparian right to use water can be exercised
at any time; there are no rights based on
prior use. Older users must reduce their
uses if necessary to accommodate newer
users.135
Missouri is a riparian doctrine
state. Although a prior case suggested
adoption of the doctrine,'3 ' the Missouri
courts expressly adopted the doctrine in
1964, in Bollinger v. Henry.' Adoption
124 See State ex rel. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co., 69 S.W, 374 (Mo. 1902).
121 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 37.005(10) (1994).
26 See supra note 61.
27 On Corps § 10 obstruction permits, see supra note 89. The Clean Water Act, § 404, also requires permits for dredging and filling
wetlands. See supra note 91.
"' See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 843 (1980); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.962 (1979).
Only in Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire do members of the public have a restricted right to cross private land, in
those states to reach "great ponds" which exceed 10 or 20 acres in size. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 3860 (West 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 91, §§ 18A, 35 (West 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:20 (Supp. 1991). See generally supra note 67, 4 WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS, section 30.06(b).
1 See State v. Bollenbach, 63 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. 1954); Branch v. Oconto County, 109 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1961).
" See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) [permit to reconstruct house on seacoast conditioned on
conveyance of beach access easement]; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) [Corps permit to dredge channel from
nonnavigable lagoon to ocean]. Cf Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994) [permit to construct parking lot conditioned on
conveyance of bicycle path easement].
13 See Jacobs v. Lyon Twp., 448 N.W.2d 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
13 These are the states in the eastern United States from the Atlantic Ocean to the tier of states on the western bank of the Mississippi
River between Minnesota and Louisiana. All lie east of the 20-inch isohyet and have humid climates.
133 24 Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
"3 See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955); Moore v. California Oregon Power Co., 140 P.2d 798 (Cal. 1943); Prather v.
Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1944); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964); Hazeltine v. Case, I N.W. 66 (Wis. 1879).
'3 Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825 (Conn. 1967); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265
S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980); Evans v. Merriwether, 4111.(3 Scam.) 492 (1842); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). On the riparian
doctrine, see generally supra note 67, I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, sections 6.01 (a)(3-4), 7.02-.03; note 67, A. TARLOCK, c. 3.
"I See Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895).
'n 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). On Missouri riparian rights generally, see generally supra note 135, 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, at 237.
See also Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429, 432-39 (1982).
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of the doctrine was confirmed in 1972 and
1979,'" where the court accepted the
guidelines of the Restatement of Torts.'"
All those decisions emphasize the
reasonable use element of riparianism.
Sixteen eastern states have
enacted diversion permit statutes to
supplement riparian rights. They require
state permits for diverting or impounding
water."' The statutes are silent on the
relationship between diversion permit
rights and common law riparian rights
when they conflict. Generally, water
diversion permits are issued only when
there is surplus water available. Because
surplus water exists in many locations in
the East, water users can acquire water
rights whenever other water users would
not suffer unreasonable adverse effects.
B. Prior Appropriation Law of Western
States
In the 17 western states, 4 '
surface water and groundwater can be
acquired only under state prior
appropriation permit systems. The prior
appropriation doctrine is characterized
by the maxim, "first in time, first in right".
Recognized first in 1855 in Irwin v.
Phillips,'4 2 it provides that water users
are entitled to take their full
appropriations of water in chronological
order of first use until the water supply is
exhausted. In times of shortage, the latest
appropriators will be cut off in inverse
order until demand equals supply. An
appropriation of a specific quantity of
water is perfected by applying for a
permit and by making a diversion and an
application of the water with due
diligence to an economically beneficial
use. 43 The location of water use is not
restricted.'" Only surplus water, if any
exists, can be acquired by new users.
C. Maintenance of Minimum
Streamflows
Riparian (eastern) states. A
few riparian cases have recognized
recreational uses by riparians as valid
riparian uses. Several cases have limited
diversions in order to protect lake and
river levels needed to maintain fishing
opportunities,145 or to prevent frequent
level fluctuations." One case has
prohibited a total diversion, holding that
the lower riparian was entitled to
sufficient water to launch his boat and
to fish on the river abutting his
shoreline.147 But if the water level is not
altered excessively, courts have denied
relief.14 Since so few states have
addressed protection of recreational
uses by riparians, it is not clear whether
the riparian doctrine generally protects
them.
This problem can be addressed
in diversion permit statutes. Fourteen of
the permit statutes in eastern states
empower the states to establish minimum
protected streamflows and prohibit
diversions of those protected flows.' 49
0' See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1971) (dictum in groundwater case); Ripka v. Wansing, 589 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.
App. 1979).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (1979).
' Arkansas (registration), Connecticut, Delaware, Florida (in water management districts), Georgia, Indiana (during emergencies), Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina (in "capacity use areas"), South Carolina (reporting), Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.203-.249 (1988); IoWA CODE ANN.
§§ 455B.261 -.275 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.100-.210 (1987 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37, .41-.462 (1987 &
Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-242 to -253 (Supp. 1991). See supra note 135, 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, sections 9.01-.06; note
135, A. TARLOCK, section 3.20; Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in States Legislation, 9 VA. ENvT'L L.J. 287 (1990); Ausness, Water
Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 547 (1983); note 137, Eastern Water Diversion.
'' These are the states in the western United States from the Pacific Ocean to the tier of states between North Dakota and Texas. They
straddle or lie west of the 20-inch isohyet and have semi-arid climates.
1 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
14 See, e.g., Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 498 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1972); City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1954); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 493 P.2d 409 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); Warner
Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 336 P.2d 884 (Or. Ct. App.1959); Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 350 P.2d 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1960). On
the prior appropriation doctrine generally, see supra note 135, 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, sections 12.01-.03, 13.01-.04, 17.01-.03; note
135, A. TARLOCK, c. 5.
'" See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
'o See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955) (rice irrigation diversion barred to prevent injury to commercial fishing resort);
Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950) (orchard diversion prohibited to prevent injury to fishing resort). See generally, Davis,
The Riparian Right of Streamflow Protection in the Eastern States, 36 ARK. L. REV. 47 (1983).
"' See, e.g., Hammond v. Antwerp Light & Power Co., 132 Misc. 786, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1928) (theory was reciprocal prescriptive
easement); Cedar Lake Hotel Co. v. Cedar Lake Hydraulic Co., 48 N.W. 371 (1891), (theory was private nuisance). But see State v. Great
Falls Mfg. Co., 83 A. 126 (N.H. 1912) (using riparian reasonableness analysis in a public nuisance case).
"I See Collins v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825 (Conn. 1967). But if the lower riparian is making no recreational use of the water,
such a diversion should not be allowed. See Nilsson v. Latimer, 664 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. 1984).
" See, e.g., Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, 102 So.2d 833 (Fla. App. 1958); Hoover v. Crane, 106 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. 1960); Meyers
v. Lafayette Club, 266 N.W. 861 (Minn. 1936).
'" See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-217(e)(2), -301(4), (lI) (1987 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-141a to -141c (1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. § 7-6029(1-2) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.042, .223(3) (1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1-7, 13-2-6.1-6 (Burns 1990 &
Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261(15),.267(1), .270 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.110 (1987 & Supp. 1990); MAsS. GEN.
LAw ANN. c. 21G, §§ 7(3)t II (Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.417(2), (3)(b) (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-3(i-j), 51-3-7(2-3)
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1 A-5(e) (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.13(b), .48 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-106, -243(B)(3), -246
(1987 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 30.18(8), 31.02(1), 31.34, 144.026(5)(1989). See generally supra note 135, I WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS, section 9.05(b); note 137, Davis, Eastern Water Diversion, at 459-60.
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Most of those statutes recite as policy
purposes protecting fish and wildlife
habitat and recreational uses of
watercourses."" In the other one-half of
riparian states, there are no statutory
minimum protected flows.
Prior appropriation (western)
states. The diversion and beneficial use
prerequisites for diversion permits make
it difficult, if not impossible, to protect
minimum flows for recreational purposes
by filing for an appropriation. Water can
be appropriated only by making a
diversion or impoundment and applying
the water to a beneficial use. Since
instream uses involve neither,
appropriations for instream uses, such
as for fish habitat, cannot be made under
traditional appropriation law, regardless
of the their economic value. Forexample,
recognition of appropriations have been
denied for enhancing water levels in a
commercial duck hunting marsh or for
fish and wildlife habitat."' Hence, under
traditional appropriation theory there is
no basis for preserving minimum
streamflows.112
In the past two decades, many
western states have addressed that
deficiency by empowering state agencies
to appropriate water for minimum
streamflows to protect fish and aquatic
habitat.' Other states authorize
administrative withdrawals of
unappropriated water.' 4 A few states
also authorize denial of permit
applications or imposition of flow
maintenance conditions in permits where
diversion would interfere with fish and
wildlife habitat or with recreational
opportunities.'" But those
appropriations require the presence of
water supplies surplus to the existing
appropriations. In many western
watersheds, most or all available water
has already been appropriated,' and
there is no water available to supply
minimum streamflows. However, much
of the water diverted from fully
appropriated streams is diverted in their
lower reaches; instream appropriations
can protect the water flows in the upper
reaches from additional diversions. 157
Note, also, that those flow protection
provisions have not been extended to
private appropriators.
VI. OTHERDOCTRINES
There are other legal doctrines
which protect public rights to use
watercourses. They include the public
trust doctrine, the doctrine of
purprestures, and the Northwest
Ordinance free navigation provisions.
A. Public Trust Doctrine
Origin. Originally the English
Crown had a common law obligation to
protect the public rights of navigation
and fishery. The 13 original states
succeeded to that obligation after the
Revolution of 1776. The federal
government succeeded to it upon
cession of the western lands by the
eastern states in 1793. Under the equal
'50 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-201 (1987 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-141b(l-4) (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. § 7-
6001(a)(4), (c)(3) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.016(2), .042(l) (1988 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-6.1 (Burns 1990 & Supp.
1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.110 (1987 & Supp. 1990); MINN. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.38(i), .417(3)(b) (1987); VA CODE ANN. § 62.1-
248(A) (Supp. 1991). See High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envt'l Management Comm'n, 276 S.E.2d 472. 477 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981).
'-' See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Fullerton v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1979); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 166 P. 309 (Utah 1917).
52 But see Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (limitation on diversion to
protect fish habitat); In re Martha Lake Water Co., 277 P. 382 (Wash. 1929) (denial of diversion permit in order to protect the level of a
recreational lake).
'" Twelve states have enacted statutes authorizing such appropriations by states agencies. See e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A)
(1987); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (1971 & Supp. 1991); COLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(4) (1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4301 to -
4312(1990) (certain specified waters); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(a) (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,107 to -2,119 (1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 533.030(2) (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-01.1, -02, -06.1 (1985 & Supp. 1991); ORE. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5)(a) (1995);
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023(7) (Vernon 1988, supp. 1991)); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.020(1)(1962, supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 41-
3-1001, 1006 to -1009 (Supp. 1991). One other state has allowed such appropriations by case decision. See State ex rel. State Game
Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1945). Such appropriations are constitutional. See Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist. v. Colorado Water Conserv. Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979); Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924
(Idaho 1974). See generally supra, note 135, 2 WATER AND WATER RicHTs, sections 14.03(c)(4)(C); note 135, A. TARLOCK, sections 5.07[3].
See also Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 420, 429-30.
11 See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.145 (1991) (including for water quality purposes); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-703a -703b (1989) (to establish
minimum streamflow); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-31 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (coupled with
definition of "beneficial use"); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.22.010; 90.54.020(3)(a) (1962 & Supp. 1991).
'" See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1991); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243.5(1971 & Supp. 1991); MoNr. REV. CODE § 85-2-311(2)(c)(i)(1991);
UTAH CODE § 73-3-8(1)(1989 & Cum. Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.22.010, 90.54.020(3)(a) (1962 & Supp. 1991). See generally
supra note 153, Ausness, at 431-32.
'." Research done by the Second National Water Assessment indicates that most western streams are heavily depleted by diversions
during the dry summer months, and have little or no surplus flows. See Bayha, Instream Flows-The Big Picture, I INSTREAM FLOw NEEDS
95, 112-18 (American Fisheries Soc'y 1976) (maps show stream depletions exceeding 70 percent in dry years throughout most of the
West).
' See supra note 153, Protection ofInstream Uses, at 430. See Note, Statutory Recognition ofInstream Flow Preservation: A Proposed
Solution for Wyoming, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 139, 151 (1982).
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footing doctrine, it passed to the new Missourihasdecidedtwocases over the edge of the bank of the
states as they were admitted to the declaring navigable waters to be held in Mississippi River because it would
Union."' This obligation has come to trust for the public. In 1903 in State ex interfere with the public's right of
be known as the public trust doctrine. rel. Citizens' Lighting & Power Co. v. navigation. The court denied a writ of
The public trust has been recognized by Longfellow, the supreme court refused mandamus to compel issuance of a
many eastern'"9 and western"' states. to allow construction of a power plant building permit, holding that ownership
"^ See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S.
977 (1983); State v. Sorenson, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
1979); Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J.
1972); People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist. Ct. 1972); 101 Ranch v. United States, 714 F.Supp. 1005
(D.N.D. 1988), aff'd 905 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1990); State ex rel. Aprynozynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1994); Thomas v.
Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio App. 1979); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987); State v. Land Concepts, Ltd., 501 N.W.2d
817 (Wis. App. 1993); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1951), aff'd on reh., 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); City of
Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1927).
On the origins of the public trust, see generally supra note 135, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS sections 29.02, 30.01-.02. See
also Davis, Protecting Waste Assimilation Streamflows by the Law of Water Allocation, Nuisances, and Public Trust, and by
Environmental Statutes, 28 NAT. RES. J. 357, 378-82 (1988). See also supra note 153, Protection of Instream Uses, note 153, at 409-
12. See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine. 71
IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-41 (1986); Davis, State Ownership ofBeds ofinaind Waters-A Summary and Reexamination, 57 NEB. L. REV.
665,666-68(1978); Comment, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 571, 576-643 (197 1).
" Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia,
Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Groves v. Sec'y of Dep't of Natural Resources of Envt'1 Control, 1994 WL 89804
(Del. Sup. 1994); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1986); State v. Ashmore, 224 S.E.2d 334 (Ga.
1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Lake Michigan Fed'n v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 742 F.Supp. 441 (N.D.I1l. 1990); People ex rel.
Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976); State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989); Save Ourselves, Inc.
v. Louisiana Envt'I Control Comm'n, 452 So.2d I152 (La. 1984); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576 (La. 1975); Bell v.
Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56 (Md. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S.
858 (1971); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. State Dep't
of Natural Resources, 263 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699 (Minn, 1963); Cinque Bambini
Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), affd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Appeal of
Committee to Save the Upper Androscoggin v. New Hampshire Water Resources Bd., 466 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1983); Matthews v. Bay
Head Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 821 (1984); State, Dep't of Envt'l Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 308 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973); New York State Water Resources Bd. v. Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284(N.Y. App. Div.
1971), appeal dismissed, 280 N.E.2d 889 (1972); State v. Forehand, 312 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Thomas v. Sanders, 413
N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); Warren Sand & Gravel Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Envt'I Resources, 341 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1975);
Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991); Bunch v. Hodel, 793 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1986); State v. Hardee, 193 S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 1972);
State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989); Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932) (but without
constraint on state authorized waste discharges); The West Indian Co. Ltd. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir.
1988); Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 93 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1956); State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492 (Wis. 1983).
A few states have acknowledged the public trust in their constitutions or statutes. See CONN. GEN. STAT. section 22a-15;
FLA. CONST., art. 10, § 11(1968, 1970); LA. CONsT., art. 9, § 1 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-73, id. tit. 38, § 435 (1964,
supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 691.1202 (1987), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271:20 (supp. 1991); PA. CONST., art. 1, § 27 (supp.
1991); R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 17 (1987) (public rights on shorelands); TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-3-102(a) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 10,
§ 1421 (1984). See also Submerged Lands Act of 1953, §§ 3(d), 6, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(d), 1314 (1986, supp. 1991) (navigation power
& servitude reserved); U.S. Territories Submerged Lands Act of 1974, §§ 2(b), (c), 48 U.S.C. § 1705(b), (c) (1987) [navigation power
& servitude reserved].
Alaska, California, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. See
CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. Land Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984), aff'g
644 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1982); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Idaho
Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987); State v. Meek, 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990) (by
implication); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev.
1972); 101 Ranch v. United States, 905 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1990); North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers, Cavalier
County Water Resource Dist., 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855
P.2d 568, 582 (Okla. 1990) (dissent); Morse v. Oregon Div'n of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979); South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v.
South Dakota Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1986); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Caminiti
v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987). Hawaii, a nonappropriation state, also has recognized the public trust doctrine. See Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1982).
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of "the shore below .. . belongs to the
State as trustee of the public, and ... the
people have the absolute proprietary
interest in the same."'"' Previously in
1875 in Benson v. Morrow, the supreme
court had held the same thing, quoting
virtually the same language, in a case
involving title to an island created by
sedimentation in the middle of the
Missouri River."'
State obligation to protect
public waters. The public trust doctrine
imposes an obligation on the states, as
trustees, to preserve navigable waters for
use by the public. It provides that the
state owns the beds of public waters and
the waters themselves, not as proprietor,
but as trustee for the benefit of the public.
The state has owned those beds and
waters from time immemorial and cannot
relinquish such title unless the
conveyance would further the purposes
of the public trust. Private bed titles
derived from the state are subject to the
public trust as a servitude."' Since the
state had original title and the public trust
is an incident of that title, exercise of state
powers to enforce the public trust does
not constitute a taking, regardless of the
extent to which the private bed titles are
diminished in value or usefulness. 'I
The state as public trustee has
a minimum obligation to protect the
public rights of navigation and fishery."
During the twentieth century, the public
trust has been expanded to protect
recreational boating, swimming, wading,
hunting, and other water-related public
uses." In many states, the public waters
may not be used for public uses unrelated
to those waters, such as for highway
rights-of-way and building sites."' But
construction of facilities in public trust
waters partly for public trust purposes
and partly for other public purposes is
permitted."
Public trust waters. In all
states, the public waters protected by
the public trust are navigable waters
under the federal definition of commercial
navigability.'" But many states have
adopted broader definitions of
navigability to include waters navigable
by recreational boats." The public trust
applies wherever those waters extend
laterally."'
Nonderogation. The state as
I'6 See State ex rel. Citizens' Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S.W. 374, 379 (Mo. 1902), citing 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 427 (12th
ed. 19xx).
162 See Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345, 351 (Mo. 1875).
"I See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc.
v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983); Lake Michigan Fndn. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F.Supp. 441, 444
(N.D.Ill. 1990); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976); State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989);
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Wicks v. Howard, 388 A.2d 1250 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Sacco v. Department of
Public Works, 227 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1967); People ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock, 196 N.W.2d 489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Smith v.
State, 545 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); New York State Water Resources Bd. v. Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971), appeal dismissed, 280 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 1972); State v. Forehand, 312 S.E.2d 247 (N.C. Ct. App.1984); 101 Ranch v. United
States, 905 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1990); State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1994); Bunch v. Hodel, 793 F.2d 129
(6th Cir. 1986); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash, 1987); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952).
On the public trust, see generally note 158, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 30.02; note 158, A. TARLOCK,
sections 5.13[3], 8.04-.05. See also I W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 2.20 (2d ed. 1986, supp. 1996); 2 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 10.05 (1973-96); Fischman, Global Warming and Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wetlands as Sea
Levels Rise, 19 HoFsTRA L. REV. 565 (1991); Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvT'L L. 485 (1989);
Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, at 527; Blumm, Public Property and the
Democratization of Wester Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, at 573; Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi
and the Public Trust Doctrine: Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 571 (1989); Davis, Protecting
Waste Assimilation Streamfiows, note 158, above, at 378-85; Ausness, Protection of Instream Uses, note 153, above, at 409-16, 421-
28; Lazarus, note above; Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (1980).
'" See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (water rights); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980); Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee
County, 898 F.2d 1490 (11 th Cir. 1990); Superior Public Rights, Inc v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 263 N.W.2d 290 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1983); New York State Water Resources Bd. v.
Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Franco-American Charolaise Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568,
582 (Okla. 1990) (dissent).
6 See supra note 163.
* See Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), af'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S.
469 (1988); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987); State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492 (Wis. 1983); Wisconsin's Environmental
Decade, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 271 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 1978).
6 See Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 227 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1967) (highway).
'" See City of Madison v. State, 83 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 1957); State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957).
* See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
I(1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64(1931).
"m See Hayes v. State, 496 S.W.2d 372 (Ark. 1973); Kerpelman v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 276 A.2d 56 (Md. 1971), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); New York State Water Resources Comm.. v. Liberman, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. 197 1); Gwathmey v. State
Through Dep't of Env't, Health and Natural Resources, 464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224(Ohio 1979);
State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957).
"' See State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 865 (198 1); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake
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public trustee may neither itself take regulate obstructions to navigation,' may choose between public trust
affirmative actions in derogation of the water levels,' diversions,' and purposes.'
public trust, nor convey away bed titles dredging," and to protect the public Enforcement by state and
free of the trust,"' nor allow private rights of navigation, recreation and beneficiaries. The state, as public
actions which would destroy or fishing."' Also, it requires the state to trustee, has standing to enforce the
substantially impair public rights under identify impacts upon public trust waters public trust.' It is not so clear whether
the trust.'" The state cannot allow as part of a planning process."' Insome members of the public, as beneficiaries
substantial destruction of public trust states, the state has an affirmative of the trust, can do so. Some courts have
waters for any non-water resource public obligation to regulate the use of public held that members of the public can sue
use,17 4 such as filling a streambed or waters' and even to enhance their the state if it regulates water uses in
draining a marsh.' usefulness for public trust purposes by derogation of the public trust orabdicates
Scope of public trust powers. developing facilities and providing its trust obligations.' In some states, a
The public trust empowers the state to improved access.' The state as trustee memberof the public can enforce public
Watershed Imp. Dist., 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So.2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub no.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P2d 1088 (Mont.
1984); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994); 101 Ranch v. United States, 714 F.Supp. 1005 (D.N.D. 1988), aied 905 F.2d
180 (8th Cir. 1990); South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v. South Dakota Water Management Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26 (1985); Wilbour v. Gallagher,
462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969), cert. denied 4ad0 U.S. 878 (1970).
'S2 ee Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980); People ex rel.
Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (111. 1976); Sec'y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So.2d 983 (Miss. 1994); Smith v. State. 545
N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y. 1989); State ex reE. Rohrer v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825 (N.C. 1988).
173 See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d Ill5 (Alaska 1988); City of
Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 632 F.Supp. 333 (N.D.Cal. 1986); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983); Lake Michigan Fedn. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 742 F.Supp. 441 (N.D.Ill. 1990); Township
of Grosse lie vt Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 167 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. App. 1969); People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo,
336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1972); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio 1979); Brusco Towboat Co. v. State ex rel. Straub,
567 P.2d 1037 (Or. 1977); Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874 (R.I. 1991); State v. Central Vermont Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989);
Commonwealth v. City of Newport News. 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932); The West Indian Co. Ltd. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 844
F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 802; Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987); State v. Bieck, 338 N.W.2d 492 (Wis.
1983).
114 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cerh. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (diversion of tributary
waters); In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist., 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924) (drainage of marsh & lake).
"d See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980); Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 227 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1967);
In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist., 196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Imp. Co., 67 N.W. 918
(Wis. 1896).
7W See Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Public Lands, 672 A.2d 91 (Me. 1996); People ex re. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d
773 (Pii. 1976); People ex re. MacMullan v. Babcock, 196 N.W.2d 489 (Mich. Ct. Apo . 1972); New York State Water Resources d. v.
Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484 (N.Y 1971); Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); Statev. Land Concepts, Ltd., 501
N.W.2d 817 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); State v. B veck, 338 NW.2d 492 (Wis. 1983); Town of Ashwaubenon v. Public. Serv. Comm'n, 125
N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1963), reh'g denied 126 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 1964).
" See North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers, Cavalier County Water Resource Dist., 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983);
Hazen v. Perkins, 105 A. 249 (Vt,. 1918); Vander Bloemen v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 551 N.W.2d 869 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
'.Y See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
'19 See Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, 412 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
0 See Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Procter v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (Mass. 1869); Nelson v. De Long, 7
N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1942); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Matthews v. Bay Head
Imp. Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); North Dakota State WaterComm'n v. Board of Managers, Cavalier County WaterResource Dist.,
332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); Jackovny v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 194 1); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div'n of Wildlife Resources, 655
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), affd55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
See National Audubon Socy v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 1983); Muench v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514(Wis. 1952).
"'See State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957).
'" See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
See Maryland v. Amerada Hess, 350 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); Kerpelman v. Maryland d. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56 (Md.
197 1), cerl. denied 404 U.S. 858 (197 1); State, Dep't of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671 (N.J.
Super Ct. Law Div. 1973); State v. Bishop, 75 Misc.2d 787,348 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash.
1969) (dictum), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878 (1970); State v. Deetz, 224 NW.2d 407 (Wis. 1974).
9" See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P2d 374 (Cal. 1971); Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 271
N.W.2d 69 (Wis. 1978) (by implication); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 3 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952). See Gould v. Greylock
Reservation Comm'n, 21r N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (by implica tion) (parklands).
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trust rights directly against a violator.'
In other states, however, a private
individual cannot enforce the trust."
The public trust doctrine is
directed to preserving the navigation and
recreational characteristics of
watercourses for the benefit of the public
and has been used extensively by both
states and members of the public for that
purpose.
B. Doctrine of Purprestures
A purpresture is an enclosure
by a private party of that which belongs
to and ought to be open and free to the
enjoyment of the public at large.
Examples include theatre marquees and
utility lines along streets and highways.
They also include piers, wharves, logging
booms, low bridges, and boathouses.
The doctrine of purprestures provides
that such a private enclosure constitutes
a public nuisance and may be abated if it
is found to unreasonably interfere with
the public's enjoyment of the public
property, easement, or right. Such
encroachments on public waters may be
enjoined if either (1) they unreasonably
interfere with the public's right of surface
use or passage, or (2) the public would
benefit more by having the encroachment
removed than if left in place. One
application of the doctrine of
purprestures is to protect the public right
of navigation from 'unreasonable
obstructions. It is applied to limit riparian
shoreowner's right to wharfout.99
Missouri appears to have
applied the concept of purprestures,
although it did not discuss the doctrine,
by declaring as a public nuisance a
structure proposed to be placed in
navigable waters.'"
Because both the doctrine of
purprestures and the public trust
doctrine treat private titles to streambeds
as subordinate to the preexisting public
right of navigation, I would argue that
they are two facets of the same doctrine.
That an unreasonable purpresture is
characterized as a public nuisance
probably is a historic development
resulting from the type of action used to
abate it.
The public trust doctrine and
the doctrine of purprestures, while
similar, are not completely analogous or
coextensive. While the public trust in
many states imposes an obligation on
the state to protect the public useability
of public waters and prohibits
substantial impediments to the public
rights of navigation and fishery, the
doctrine of purprestures authorizes, but
does not require, such regulation.
C. Northwest Ordinance
There is another basis for
protecting boating rights of the public in
a few states. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, which set the pattern for
organizing the federal territories,
contained a free navigation clause. It
provided:
The navigable waters leading
into the Mississippi and the St.
Lawrence, and the carrying
places between the same, shall
be common highways and
forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of said territory, as
to the citizens of the United
States, and those of any other
states that may be admitted into
the confederacy without any
tax, duty or impost therefor.'
Some of the statutes organizing other
federal territories contained variants of
the same clause. Congress included it in
the acts of admission to the union of
some of the new states and sometimes
required them to include it in their state
constitutions.' 92
A few state cases hold that the
Northwest Ordinance free navigation
clause and its progeny make navigable
waters a public highway and impresses
private titles to streambeds with a public
easement of passage.'" It has been
interpreted as prohibiting physical
obstructions as well as prohibiting
taxation of riverborne trade. 94
The Supreme Court has stated
in dictum and a state court has held that
the Ordinance remains in force even if
" See MICH. COMP. L. ANN, § 691.1202 (1987); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974).
Sec Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56 (Md. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
*1 SeeShively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894) (dictum); Woods v. Johnson, 241 Cal. App. 2d 278, (Cal. 1966); Frink v. Lawrence, 20Conn.
I17 (Conn. 1849); Lovejoy v. WaterResources Comm'n, 332 A.2d 108 (Conn. 1973); Freed v. Miami Beach PierCorp., 112 So. 841 (Fla.
1927); City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 50 N.W. 661 (Mich. 1891); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 85 N.E. 1093 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1908). Cf. State v. Kuluvar, 123 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1963); Haber's Sodus Point Bait Shop, Inc. v. Wigle, 139 A.D.2d 950 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988), appeal denied 73 N.Y.2d 701 (1988); Capune v. Robbins, 160 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. 1968); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash.
1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
On purprestures, see generally supra note 158, I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 6.01 (a)(2), at 111-12; note 163, A. TARLOCK,
section 3.17[ 1 ][a]; Plager, Interference with the Public Right ofNavigation and the Riparian Owner's Claim of Privilege, 33 Mo. L.
REv. 608 (1968); Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, I AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 103, 107, 109 (1957); J. GOULD, LAW OF
WATERS § 21 (3d ed. 1900); H. WOOLRYCH, LAW OF WATERS 214-15 (2d ed. 1847); J. ANGELL, TIDEWATERS 196-206 (2d ed. 1847); R.
CALLIS, SEWERS 174(2d ed. 1685).
'" See State ex rel. Citizens' Elec. Lighting & Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1902).
"' See Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. IV, I Stat. 52 (1789).
192 Missouri's history of the free navigation clause is illustrative. See Missouri Territorial Act of 1812, § 15, 2 Stat. 743; Missouri
Admission Act of 1820, § 2, 3 Stat. 545; Mo. CONsT.OF 1820, art. 10, para. 2; Mo. CoNsT. OF 1865, art. I1, para. 2; Mo. Co.NsT. oF 1875,
art. 1. There is no similar provision in the current constitution, Mo. CONST. OF 1945.
'" See Elder v. Delcour, 269 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1954); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), aff'd on reh., 55
N.W.2d 40 (1952). See generally supra note 158, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, section 30.06(a).
"' See supra note 193. However, one has held that "forever free" means free of political regulations hampering freedom of commerce, but
not free of state-authorized physical obstructions. See Captain Soma Boat Line v. City of Wisconsin Dells, 255 N.W.2d 441 (Wis. 1977)
(partial obstruction by low fixed bridge).
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the clause does not appear in the state
constitution or statutes. 95 But the
Supreme Court had stated previously and
the same state court has held
subsequently that the Northwest
Ordinance applied only during the
territorial period and has no effect after
statehood.'" While the cases conflict
whether the Northwest Ordinance free
navigation clause continues to have
direct effect, it is clear that such
constitutional and act of admission
provisions remain enforceable.
Five states today have
Northwest Ordinance free navigation
clauses in their state constitutions. 97
The statehood admission acts of five
states also contain Northwest Ordinance
free navigation clauses.'" Since the free
navigation clauses of the state admission
acts should still be in force, there are a
total of ten states, including Missouri,'"
where a free navigation clause remains
operative.
VIL CONCLUSION
The rights of boaters are
influenced by many federal and state case
law doctrines. The federal navigation
power is focused primarily on commercial
navigation on major watercourses and
on coastal waters. The Northwest
Ordinance free navigation clause and its
progeny grants free navigation rights on
major inland waters. Those navigation
rights include freedom from unlicensed
obstructions. Where commercial
navigation rights exist, recreational
boaters, too, have coincidental rights.
State law doctrines include the
right of the public to use recreational
boats on public waters, the right of
riparians to wharf out and to use the
surface of abutting waters, water
allocation doctrines (riparian and prior
appropriation in the eastern and western
states), the public trust doctrine, and the
doctrine of purprestures. Although the
scope of rights granted by those
doctrines varies between the states,
boaters have been granted extensive
rights to use the surface and to be free
from unreasonable obstructions; they
have less extensive rights to flow and
water level maintenance.
' See Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1921) (dictum); Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist.,
196 N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924). See Note, Constitutional Law--Ordinance of 1787-Navigable Waters-Carrying Places Between the Same,
1939 Wis. L. REV. 547, 548-53; Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 542, 551-67.
See Escanaba Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1882); Flambeau River Lumber Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 N.W. 671 (Wis.
1931).
1" Alabama, Minnesota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See AL.A. CoNsT., art. 1, § 24 (1901); MINN. CONsT., art. 2, § 2 (1974);
S.C. CONST., art. 14, § 1(1970); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (1870) [free navigation of Mississippi River); Wis. CoNsT., art.9, § 1 (1848).
' California, Iowa, Louisiana. Missouri, and Oregon. See California Admission Act of 1850, § 3, 9 Stat. 452; Iowa Admission Act of
1845, § 3, 5 Stat. 742; Louisiana Admission Act of 1812, § 1, 2 Stat. 701; Missouri Admission Act of 1820, § 2, 3 Stat. 545; Oregon
Admission Act of 1859, § 2, 11 Stat. 383. (State statute codifications often reprint these admission acts.)
'9 Missouri's statehood admission act contains a free navigation clause. See supra note 198. Missouri's 1945 Constitution does not
contain a free navigation clause, although all earlier ones did. See supra note 192.
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